Generosity, anonymity, gender

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Received 1 June 2004; accepted 17 November 2004
Available online 1 September 2005

Abstract

We examine experimentally how a person's generosity depends on the degree of anonymity between giver and recipient, as well as on the parties' sexes. Less is given when the giver is paid on stage rather than in private; men receive less than women; fewer men than women give non-zero amounts. The results suggest that it may be problematic to organize experimental data in terms of social distance. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

JEL classification: A13; C91; D63; D64; J71

Keywords: Generosity; Anonymity; Gender; Social distance; Discrimination

1. Introduction

How does a person's generosity depend on the degree of anonymity between giver and recipient, as well as on the sex of either party? We provide answers based on an experiment.

Our approach relies on the dictator game, a popular tool in experimental research introduced by Forsythe et al. (1994) and possibly the simplest vehicle for investigating generosity: one person (the dictator) divides a sum of money between her-/himself and
another person (the recipient), and payments are made accordingly. We manipulate the
degree of anonymity between subjects by varying the circumstances under which payments
are made. In treatments with private payment (PP), subjects pick up their payments with-
out directly identifying themselves to others while in treatments with on stage payment
(OS), the dictators receive their payments in a lecture hall with a few hundred co-students
present (clapping and cheering, as it turned out and could reasonably have been expected).
In addition, the dictator is informed about the sex of the recipient via the wording of the
instructions, and we observe the sex of the dictator.

We report results concerning the importance of each of the three controls in our $2 \times 2 \times 2$
design (payment condition, dictator’s sex, recipient’s sex). In a nutshell, less is given with
payments on stage rather than in private, men receive less than women, and fewer men than
women give non-zero amounts. In our discussion of these results, we concentrate mainly
on the first result, which is where we feel we have something useful to say. We argue that
it may be problematic to organize experimental data in terms of “social distance” if this
notion is taken to vary one-to-one with anonymity. As anonymity is manipulated it is likely
that other motivationally relevant aspects change as well, introducing serious confounding
factors.

We present our design, the results and our discussion (including citations of related work)
in Sections 2, 3 and 4.

2. The design

The experiment was run in the spring of 2000 at Stockholm University. We addressed 388
students enrolled in the introductory microeconomics course. Participation was voluntary
and involved answering a question concerning how to divide 1000 Swedish kronor ($\approx US$110 at the time) between oneself and another student in the course referred to either as a randomly selected female student or as a randomly selected male student. We explained that
one thus created student pair would be selected at random to receive payments in accordance
with the chosen division.

Participants had to specify a “code number” consisting of the student’s initials plus the
last four digits of her/his social security number. In Sweden, this reveals a person’s sex,
which we could thus observe. The instructions then described how a subject (if selected)
would be paid. Depending on treatment, the subject who made the division would either
pick up the payment in private (by showing up at our offices) or would have to come on
stage during an auditorium lecture (the amount being announced, a few hundred people
watching). The recipient’s payment was made in private.

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1 The working paper version of our paper, Dufwenberg and Muren (2002), includes a more detailed version of
this section as well as the experimental instructions. Go to http://www.ne.su.se/paper/wp02_02.pdf.
2 We explained that the selection would be made at an auditorium lecture to which all students were invited. We
actually paid 1000 kronor to one pair of students for each version of the instructions, but we did not mention that
beforehand in order not to indicate that different treatments were involved.
3 Swedish SSNs have 10 digits, specifying year–month–day of birth plus four digits where the penultimate one is
even for a woman and odd for a man.
Table 1
Means (medians) donated, \(N=352\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Private payment</th>
<th>On stage payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To female</td>
<td>To male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From female</td>
<td>334 (425)</td>
<td>323 (400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From male</td>
<td>352 (499)</td>
<td>276 (223)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This cell has 46 observations and any value between the two middle observations, 1 and 10, is a median (see DeGroot, 1975, pp. 315–316).

3. Results

Of the 388 students, 352 took active part in the experiment. The raw data is in Appendix A. Fig. 1 indicates the overall frequencies of donated amounts in categories 0–50, 51–100, . . . , 951–1000. The average is 275 kronor. The distribution is concentrated around 0 and 500 kronor.

Table 1 displays means (and medians) of donation for each of our eight cells

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4 Among the remaining 36 subjects, in three cases the code number did not correspond to the four-digit standard and in one case it was illegible. The remaining 32 chose not to participate; 20 of these came from the OS condition with a female recipient, and a Fisher exact test rejects independence of the (dichotomous) variables “Participation” and “OS payment” for female recipients, as well as of “Participation” and “Female dictator” for the OS payment condition (\(P=0.002\) and 0.001, respectively).

5 The overall distribution is reasonably consistent with previous dictator findings, although equal splits seem more frequent. Compare the results surveyed by Roth (1995).
Table 2
Proportions of non-zero donations, N = 352

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private payment</th>
<th>On stage payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From female</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From male</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Visual inspection suggests that dictators overall donate less money in the OS than in the PP treatment and that more money is donated to women, particularly from men. To determine whether these results are statistically significant, we first split the whole data set into two parts according to which treatment variable is in focus and apply the non-parametric Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test. Results: The donations made in the PP and OS treatments differ \( (P = 0.001) \), donations to men and women differ \( (P = 0.01) \), and donations by men and women do not differ \( (P = 0.16) \).

Our data can also be analyzed by focusing on the proportions of subjects who give strictly positive amounts to the recipient. Restricting attention to the 269 out of 352 data points involving non-zero donations, we can no longer reject any of the three hypotheses of no differences between treatment groups. In light of this, we create a new variable, “non-zero donation”, for which Table 2 shows the proportions across cells.

To test for statistical significance, we use the Chi-square test. Results: The frequency of non-zero donations differs between the PP and OS treatments \( (P = 0.001) \), differs according to the recipient’s sex \( (P = 0.03) \) and differs according to the dictator’s sex \( (P = 0.01) \). The first two of these results are in spirit with our earlier ones, but the last result is different since we had no significant gender difference in donated amounts.

4. Discussion, in particular regarding social distance

We have reported results concerning the impact on generosity of: (i) anonymity, (ii) the sex of the person giving and (iii) the sex of the receiving person. We have little more to say

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6 In this test, the data is ranked and the test assumes a continuous distribution where the probability of a tie is zero. When ties occur, as in our data, average ranks are assigned to tied data and the test statistic is calculated accordingly. The effect of correcting for ties is small (see Siegel and Castellan, 1988, pp. 134–136). All tests are two-tailed.

7 The (parametric) analysis of variance (ANOVA) gives the same results: the effects of “OS payment” and “Female recipient” are significant \( (P = 0.002 \text{ and } 0.03) \); the effect of “Female dictator” is not \( (P = 0.57) \).

8 Significance levels for the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney tests are \( P = 0.17, 0.21 \text{ and } 0.43 \). The hypothesis that the non-zero donations are normally distributed is not rejected, and ANOVA tests confirm the result \( (P = 0.14, 0.23 \text{ and } 0.22 \text{ for the variables “OS payment”, “Female dictator” and “Female recipient”}) \).

9 We test the hypothesis of independent variables for the dichotomous variable “Non-zero donation” against the three treatment variables one at the time. \( N = 352 \), there are at least 26 observations per cell and expected frequencies are at least 38 for each of the cells. Thus, the Chi-square test for \( 2 \times 2 \text{ tables is appropriate (see Siegel \text{ and Castellan}, 1988, pp. 111–124). All tests are two-tailed.} \)

10 In a logistic regression of the variable “Non-zero donation” on the three treatment variables simultaneously, each has a significant effect \( (P = 0.001, 0.01 \text{ and } 0.05 \text{ for “OS payment”, “Female dictator” and “Female recipient”}) \). The direction of the effect is positive for “Female dictator” and “Female recipient” and negative for “OS payment”. The results are thus confirmed.
about (ii) and (iii). Our findings speak to the associated experimental literatures on gender differences and on discrimination.\footnote{Bolton and Katok (1995), Eckel and Grossman (1998), Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and Ben-Ner et al. (2004) have results regarding gender differences and generosity. The last two of these, as well as Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Holm (2000), Eckel and Grossman (2001) and Holm and Engseld (2001) have results about discrimination. Dufwenberg and Muren discuss these results in more depth.} Results in these areas seem to be (to cite a referee) “all over the map”, and we do not feel confident drawing far-reaching conclusions beyond presenting our data. We do feel that we have something useful to say regarding (i), however, which is what we do in the remainder of this paper.

The term “social distance” is defined by the Encyclopedia of Psychology (Kazdin, 2000) as “the perceived distance between individuals or groups”. The concept has a long history in social science research. Bogardus (1928) developed a scale to measure it based on statements such as “I would marry this person” and “I would have this person excluded from the country”, suggesting that he had a rather multi-faceted notion in mind. When economists picked up on the concept, they focused on one particular aspect: anonymity. Hence, there is a connection to (i). Two influential studies are Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996), who investigate dictator games and find that selfishness increases with anonymity. These findings have inspired or spawned several other studies.\footnote{See Bohnet and Frey (1999a,b), Bolton et al. (1998), Charness and Gneezy (in press), Frohlich et al. (2000, 2004) and Johannesson and Persson (2000).}

The PP and the OS treatments in our study involve far less anonymity than any in Hoffman et al., but since OS involves less anonymity than PP it may seem natural to expect dictators to donate more money in the former case.\footnote{Results by Rege and Telle (2004) could fuel this expectation further. In a public goods experiment, they find that subjects increase their contributions if their identity and contribution are revealed.} Against this background, we were surprised to find that our results go in the opposite direction.

In retrospect, we feel that there is a lesson in this, namely that it is problematic to organize experimental data in terms of social distance if this notion is taken to vary one-to-one with anonymity. As anonymity changes other things may change alongside so that confounding factors may inadvertently be introduced. A stark example of this is provided by Frohlich et al. (2000), who report that as anonymity is increased in dictator games, subjects in the dictator position may start disbelieving the very existence of a recipient. In our design, other confounding factors are conceivable, as going on stage in the OS treatment may involve a whole new array of considerations (for example, if a dictator suffers from stage fright or is an exhibitionist) on top of the reduction of anonymity.\footnote{See also Frohlich et al. (2004), who report evidence suggesting other ways in which changes in design alter how subjects perceive the experimental context. We suspect that similar concerns may have influenced the results of other studies. As an example, consider Johannesson and Persson (2000) who replicate the highest social distance treatment in Hoffman et al. (1994), with subjects being students at the Stockholm School of Economics. The treatment is compared with a control in which the recipients are randomly selected persons from the Swedish public, to whom (positive) donations are sent by mail. Johannesson and Persson suggest that since the interacting subjects are no longer students at the same university, this “removes any possible remaining reciprocity” in the design. We find it reasonable to suspect, however, that their imaginative design introduces a completely new aspect in the minds of dictators. They may feel intrigued by the thought of the unexpecting recipient opening a letter to find a lot, or a little, money inside. This may in itself influence dictators’ decisions.}
This observation suggests that rather than focus merely on anonymity one may want to zoom in on those other considerations that may change alongside. One possibility could be group or audience effects. In an early study on group bargaining, Shogren (1989) finds that bargainers who are loyal to a group are considerably less likely to settle for an equal split than if they act as individuals. The reason suggested is loyalty, but a possible alternative is that the presence of an observing group affects behavior. Another hypothesis is that individuals adapt their self-presentation strategies to the expectations of their audience in order to gain self-approval. This view receives support in an experimental study by Juvonen and Murdock (1993), whose student subjects responded differently to peers than to parents or teachers. One of our referees seems to have favored such an interpretation of our data, and we close this paper by citing her/him:

“I am not surprised that first-year economics students do not give more to others with less social distance than in the (more) anonymous treatment. These students want to please their fellow students, especially at the beginning of the course where people do not yet know each other but want to make friends. An aspiring economist may be well advised to conform to the economic stereotype of selfishness.”

Acknowledgements

We thank Gary Charness, Uri Gneezy, Simon Gächter, Håkan Holm, Magnus Johannesson, Georg Kirchsteiger, Lisa Rutström, Peter Skogman Thoursie, two referees, coeditor David Grether, and the participants of several seminars for helpful comments.

Appendix A. Kronor donated for all 352 observations organized by treatment group

(1) On-stage payment, female dictator, female recipient:

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 250, 300, 300, 400, 400, 400, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500.

(2) Private payment, female dictator, female recipient:

0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 50, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 200, 200, 200, 250, 250, 250, 300, 300, 300, 302, 400, 400, 450, 460, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500.

(3) On-stage payment, male dictator, female recipient:

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 9, 50, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 139, 200, 200, 200, 250, 400, 490, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 681, 1000.

(4) Private payment, male dictator, female recipient:

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 50, 100, 100, 200, 200, 300, 300, 334, 400, 400, 499, 499, 499, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 500, 681, 1000.
(5) On-stage payment, female dictator, male recipient:

|   | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 20 | 50 | 100 | 100 | 150 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 300 | 400 | 400 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 |

(6) Private payment, female dictator, male recipient:

|   | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 100 | 100 | 200 | 200 | 300 | 300 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 999 |

(7) On-stage payment, male dictator, male recipient:

|   | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 100 | 100 | 200 | 200 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 300 | 300 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 495 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 600 |

(8) Private payment, male dictator, male recipient:

|   | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 200 | 223 | 300 | 300 | 400 | 495 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 600 | 750 | 900 | 999 |

References


